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196 Abstract
In this paper, an analysis of the performance of public and private sector firms 
operating in five different industries over the period 2011 to 2015 has been made. 
Using data envelopment analysis (DEA), the performance has been measured in 
respect of technical efficiency. To compare the performance of public and private 
sector firms, two distinct methodologies have been used: independent samples 
t-test and the Tobit regression model. The results of t-test indicate that the private 
sector has significantly higher technical efficiency in two industries but in one 
industry is outperformed by the public sector. In the remaining two industries, 
both sectors are equally efficient or inefficient. While the results of the Tobit model 
show that even after controlling for the firm- and industry-specific characteristics 
as well as the scale effect, in three industries the public sector has a managerial 
efficiency significantly higher than the private sector, which is found to be more 
efficient only in one industry.
Keywords: state ownership, performance, data envelopment analysis
1 INTRODUCTION 
From the Second Five Year Plan (1956-1961) to the economic reforms of 1991 the 
public sector played a dominant role in the Indian economy and was often regarded 
as the engine of economic growth. However, despite its enormous contribution to 
the economic development of the country, the public sector had to face severe 
criticism due to its low profitability and under-utilization of capacity. In order to 
improve the performance of public sector enterprises (PSEs) by introducing com-
petition, the Government of India (GOI) adopted the policy of de-reservation and 
disinvestment as a part of the economic reforms initiated in 1991. Since then, the 
GOI has been following the policy of privatization to increase the efficiency of 
PSEs, according to the belief that private ownership establishes the market for 
corporate control by allowing the tradability of property rights and therefore 
improves the quality of management. In this sequence, the GOI introduced the 
Competition Act in 2002 which replaced the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act, 1969 (MRTP Act) in order to promote and sustain competition in 
Indian markets. The Competition Act provides enough freedom to the private sec-
tor firms to expand on a level playing field. Moreover, the doors are also opened 
to competition from foreign firms by extending the limits of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) up to 100 percent in many sectors. Opening up the economy to foreign 
competition has also forced a considerable restructuring of the private corporate 
sector via consolidation, mergers, and acquisitions as many domestic firms are 
now concentrating on their core competencies and exiting from unrelated and 
diversified fields (Dasani, 2011). It induced the free inflow of FDI along with 
modern cutting edge technology, which considerably increased the importance of 
the private sector in the Indian economy. This further fuelled competition amongst 
same-industry players and even in government firms. 
The aim of this paper is to compare the performance of public and private sector 
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197enough competition had been infused into the Indian economy. The underlying 
hypothesis of the present study is that (public or private) ownership does not have 
any significant impact on the performance (measured in terms of technical effi-
ciency) of a firm.
The rest of the paper is structured into six sections. Section 2 presents a brief 
overview of the theoretical debate on the ownership and performance issue. Sec-
tion 3 reviews the existing empirical literature on this issue available at national 
and international levels. Section 4 presents a brief outline of the methodological 
aspects of this study. The empirical findings are discussed in section 5 and finally, 
section 6 concludes.
2 OVERVIEW OF THEORETICAL DEBATE
Despite the existence of a large volume of theoretical and empirical literature, the 
question regarding the ownership and performance issue has still not been settled. 
The theoretical debate on this issue is based on property rights hypothesis, public 
choice theory, and principal-agent problem. The property rights hypothesis as pro-
pounded by Alchian (1965) and de Alessi (1980) postulates that firms in the pri-
vate sector should operate with more efficiency and profitability than those in 
public sector. Manne (1965) and Fama (1980) argued that in the case of an effi-
cient capital market, poor managerial performance is reflected in falling share 
prices, which make these firms highly vulnerable to takeover raids. Therefore, the 
threat of replacing the current management through takeovers serves as an effec-
tive mechanism in disciplining the current management as well as the aligning of 
shareholders in private firms. Since the shares of government owned firms are not 
tradable in the capital market, this mechanism does not work for PSEs (Sarkar, 
Sarkar and Bhaumik, 1998). Against this, Grossman and Hart (1980) emphasized 
that market failure associated with a large number of shareholders can make the 
functioning of the market for corporate control ineffective. For example, an indi-
vidual shareholder can ignore the effect of his/her decision regarding the selling/
holding of shares on the outcome of takeover raid. If there are more chances of 
success of a takeover bid, he/she will prefer to hold so that he/she can participate 
in the profit gains resulting from the replacement of the current management with 
the new one (Yarrow et al., 1986).
The public choice theorists like Niskanen (1975) and Levy (1987) support the 
argument of the property rights hypothesis. Regardless of the market conditions, 
state ownership gives rise to a particular type of X-inefficiency associated with the 
utility maximizing behaviour of bureaucrats. They argued that the bureaucrats 
(the agents) are more intent on maximizing their own utility or the utility of pres-
sure groups than on the welfare of the public (the principal). Moreover, Estrin and 
Perotin (1991) pointed that government attempts at accommodating the interest of 
various pressure groups coupled with multiple and frequently changing objectives 
of PSEs exacerbate the above principal-agent problem by making it more difficult 
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198 The principal-agent problem may arise in the case of privately owned big corpora-
tions due to the divorce between ownership and control. This gives rise to the 
problem of asymmetric information since the agents (managers) possess more 
information regarding the true performance of firm than the principals (the share-
holders). Therefore, the agents act in their own interests rather than pursuing the 
interests of the principals. The principals can overcome this problem by motivat-
ing the agents through some appropriate incentives based on the outcome of man-
agerial efforts. However, there are two major problems with this incentive-based 
monitoring: first, monitoring by some shareholders generates spill over benefits 
for others, which may lead the sub-optimal levels of monitoring (Yarrow et al., 
1986). Second, if there is a risk associated with the outcome of managerial deci-
sions and the agent is risk averse, this outcome based incentive mechanism breaks 
down (Shavell, 1979).
Due to the non-tradability of shares, no market for corporate control exists for 
PSEs. However, it does not necessarily imply the absence of managerial incentives 
for these enterprises. Williamson (1975) has proved that, in appropriate situations, 
efficient monitoring might come into effect through hierarchical arrangements in a 
state-owned enterprise. Moreover, government can offer profit-based incentives to 
efficient officials and/or fire personnel responsible for poor performance. Against 
the market alternative, government monitoring has two possible merits: it does not 
face the free-rider problem arising from the dispersed shareholdings, and it can 
immediately take into account the deviations between social and private returns in 
the goods market as well as in the factor market (Yarrow et al., 1986).
Another argument often given in favour of privatization stresses that nationaliza-
tion increases the power of labour unions to extract higher wages from the govern-
ment, since government officials and supervising ministries have less incentive to 
minimize the unit cost of labour than their private counterparts (Yarrow et al., 
1986). Against this, however, it may be argued that government has more incen-
tive to have a tough negotiating stand than its private counterparts for at least two 
reasons. First, government has greater resources at its disposal, which enhances its 
ability to face the union’s pressure and resulting losses. Second, a generous settle-
ment by the government in one area can be considered a sign of weakness by the 
public negotiators in other areas. If government does not take into account this 
demonstration effect, it may lead to more generous settlements to labour in these 
areas. Therefore as compared to employers in private sector, the government has 
a relatively high motivation to attain a reputation for toughness (Kreps and Wil-
son, 1982; Yarrow et al., 1986). 
3 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
Till now, a large volume of empirical literature has grown on the ownership-per-
formance issue and the impact of privatization. Among the most popular studies, 
that of Boardman and Vining (1989) examined the relative performance of the 
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199and concluded that private sector was a superior performer to the public sector. 
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) by using the data reported in Fortune magazine 
for a heterogeneous group of very large firms doing business around the world, 
compared the profitability of the public and private sector firms and found the 
private sector more profitable than the public sector. Further, Goldeng, Grünfeld 
and Benito (2008) analyzed the profitability of Norwegian firms and concluded 
that privately owned firms performed significantly better than the state-owned 
firms. Against it, Caves and Christensen (1980) and Färe, Grosskopf and Logan 
(1985) documented evidence of high performance by PSEs relative to private 
firms. By reviewing a number of other international studies, Martin and Parker 
(1997) found mixed evidence. Further, Thompson and Pederson (1996) analyzed 
the impact of the ownership structure of the 100 largest firms of several European 
countries. They found no indication that ownership modes systemically affect the 
firm’s performance in terms of growth and profitability. Among more recent stud-
ies, Mijić, Jakšić and Berber (2015) compared the productivity and profitability of 
public and private firms operating in the Central and Eastern Europe region and 
found that the private sector has significantly higher profitability and productivity 
than that of public sector in most of the countries of the region. 
As far as privatization is concerned, Megginson, Nash van Randenborgh (1994) 
analyzed the impact of privatization on the financial and operating performance of 
61 firms belonging to 18 countries and 32 industries by comparing their perfor-
mance in pre- and post-privatization period. They found that privatization signifi-
cantly improved the performance of firms in terms of various parameters. Boubakri 
and Cosset (1998) analyzed the performance of 79 firms belonging to 21 develop-
ing economies that witnessed full and partial privatization during the period from 
1980 to 1992. Their results showed a significant increase in profitability and oper-
ating efficiency after privatization. In contrast, Qi, Wu and Zhang (2000) by taking 
a sample of Chinese state-owned firms, analyzed the relationship between firm 
performance and tradable shares and found that diffused ownership by individual 
domestic and foreign investors did not improve a firm’s performance. On the other 
hand, Frydman et al. (1999), taking a sample of 218 firms from the various transi-
tion economies, found improvements in the performance of these firms in the post-
privatization era, although they emphasized that improvement in performance is 
contingent on getting the design of privatization right. In this sequence, La Porta 
and Lopez-De-Silanes (1999) gave similar evidence of improvements in a firm’s 
performance due to privatization in Mexico. Subsequently, Galal et al. (1994), 
Zhang, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2008), and Estrin et al. (2009) concluded that in 
developing countries, competition is more important than privatization for improv-
ing the performance of PSEs. On the other hand, Bartel and Harrison (2005), Meg-
ginson (2005), Tongzon and Heng (2005), and Pina and Torres (2006) concluded 
that the policy of privatization would be more effective in a competitive environ-
ment and therefore, suggested that both privatization and competition should go 
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200 In India, most of the literature on the ownership-performance issue is rather inad-
equate, especially in relation to the period following the Competition Act, 2002.
The majority of the studies in this regard dealt with the banking sector and docu-
mented the superior performance of public sector banks as against their private 
counterparts following deregulation, which helped public sector banks to enhance 
their performance through the introduction of competition in the banking industry. 
The banking industry is subject to asymmetric information and moral hazard; 
therefore, it differs from other industrial sectors, like the manufacturing sector. 
Moreover, in developing countries like India, the public have a trust in govern-
ment-owned financial institutions. All of these factors may be responsible for the 
relatively high efficiency of public sector banks in India. Only a few attempts have 
been made to analyze the relative performance of public and private sector firms in 
the non-banking industries in India. Among the earlier studies, Dholakia (1978) 
and Gupta (1982) investigated the performance of PSEs in the pre-reform period. 
They found that the performance of PSEs was improving over time. Bhaya (1990) 
examined the relative performance of public and private sector over the period 
1982 to 1986. He measured the performance in terms of partial labour and capital 
productivities and concluded that public or private ownership did not have any 
significant impact on performance. However, in terms of returns on investment, the 
private sector did better than its public counterpart. Ahluwalia (1995), taking a 
sample of 762 Indian firms, including 221 state owned firms and 541 large private 
sector companies, compared the performance of public and private sectors in terms 
of average gross returns on capital employed. He found the sectors do not differ 
significantly in terms of average gross returns. However, when the PSEs belonging 
to the petroleum and refinery industry were excluded from the public sector, a sig-
nificant decline in the returns for public sector was observed. Further, Ramaswamy 
(2001) observed that PSEs were not performing as well as their private counter-
parts and the magnitude of private versus public sector performance increased with 
increasing competitive intensity. Gupta (2005), using data from 1990 to 2002 on 
Indian PSEs, measured the impact of partial privatization on profitability, produc-
tivity, and investment and she concluded that partial privatization has a positive 
impact on all of these performance indicators. One serious drawback with the 
above studies is that they measured the performance of the public sector in terms 
of profitability. It does not seem justifiable to compare public and private sector 
firms solely on the basis of profitability, since they are operating in different types 
of environment, have different types of organizational structure and different types 
of goals. Since both public and private sector use the scarce resources of the coun-
try, therefore, the performance must be measured and compared in terms of effi-
ciency or productivity rather than measuring it merely in terms of profitability. 
Ahuja and Majumdar (1998), Majumdar (1998), and Mohan and Ray (2003) 
attempted to bridge this gap by measuring and comparing the performance of the 
public and private sector in respect of technical efficiency using DEA.
Ahuja and Majumdar (1998) assessed the DEA based efficiency of 68 PSEs work-
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201mean technical efficiency scores of these PSEs range between 0.35 and 0.39. They 
suggested that privatization can improve efficiency of these PSEs. Majumdar (1999) 
compared the performance across four categories of firms: central government 
PSEs, state government PSEs (India is a federation of states), joint sector enter-
prises, and privately owned enterprises. The results demonstrated that private enter-
prises were reported highly efficient followed by joint sector enterprises and the 
enterprises owned by centre or state government. However, in these studies, perfor-
mance was measured across highly heterogeneous samples of firms belonging to 
diverse industrial sectors and therefore they clubbed together firms with widely dif-
fering technologies. A meaningful comparison of performance and efficiency 
through DEA requires at least a modest degree of homogeneity among the decision-
making units being compared. Keeping in view the problem of lumping together the 
data of heterogeneous firms, Mohan and Ray (2003) investigated the relative effi-
ciency of the public and the private sector using firm level data for the period 1992 
to 1999. They found that in five out of eight industries, handing over public sector 
firms to private ownership will not make any significant improvements in efficiency. 
All of these studies belong to the pre-reform period or the period when economic 
reforms were just initiated. In the pre-reform period, the public sector was a dom-
inant player in the Indian industrial sector and faced negligible competition from 
the private sector. The most recent studies on the ownership and performance 
issue have been conducted by Kaur and Kumar (2010), Gupta, Jain and Yadav 
(2011) and Jain (2017). Kaur and Kumar (2010) compared the technical efficiency 
of foreign, private, and public sector pharmaceutical firms in the Indian context. 
They found that foreign owned firms perform more efficiently than domestic firms 
and the private sector firms perform more efficiently than PSEs. They regarded the 
difference in the technologies used by these firms as the main reason for perfor-
mance differentials. Gupta, Jain and Yadav (2011) analyzed the financial perfor-
mance of disinvested central PSEs in India on pre and post disinvestment basis 
over the period, 1986-87 to 2009-10. The authors observed a significant decline in 
the performance of PSEs measured in terms of profitability and major efficiency 
ratios after disinvestment and suggested that partial disinvestment was not a suc-
cessful measure for improving the financial performance of the PSEs across vari-
ous industrial sectors. By using stochastic frontier analysis, Jain (2017) measured 
the performance of 238 central PSEs (belonging to various sectors) for the period 
1991 to 2010. She found a strong and positive relationship between disinvestment 
and efficiency of PSEs.
Against this background, the present study differs from the previous studies in two 
respects. First, it tries to measure the relative performance of the public and pri-
vate sector in today’s competitive environment. Second, unlike the previous stud-
ies using firm level data, it avoids the problem of lumping together disparate 
industrial categories. The efficiency of a firm belonging to a particular industry 
must be analyzed against an efficient production frontier estimated from the 
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202 meaningful measure of technical efficiency by controlling for technological het-
erogeneity across varied industrial sectors (Mohan and Ray, 2003).
4 METHODOLOGY
4.1 SAMPLE AND DATA
For the purpose of the present study, five industries viz. engineering goods, ferti-
lizers, mining/minerals, refineries, power generation & supply; have been identi-
fied, in which both public and private sectors have a massive presence. From each 
industry, a sample of ten or more firms having at least a 50 percent share (or 
above) in the total sales of their respective industries, has been selected. The study 
is based on firm-level data and covers a period of five years from 2011 to 2015.
The detailed data on profit-loss accounts and balance sheets have been obtained 
from Capitaline database. Table 1 shows percentage share of selected firms in 
total sales of their respective industries.
Table 1
Percentage share of selected firms in total sales of industry in 2015
Selected industry No. of selected firms Percentage share in industry’s sales




Powergeneration & supply 17 64.85
Source: Capitaline database.
4.2 DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
This is a linear programming technique, initially developed by Charnes, Cooper 
and Rhodes (CCR) (1978) and further generalized by Banker, Charnes and Cooper 
(BCC) (1984), to evaluate the efficiency of a homogeneous set of decision-mak-
ing units. An input-orientated version of DEA (where the objective is to minimize 
inputs for a given level of output) with the assumption of constant returns to scale 
(CRS), proceeds by solving a sequence of linear programming problems:
Minimize En, subject to:
where there are N organizations in the sample producing i different outputs (y) and 
using K different inputs (x). The wj are weights applied across the N organizations. 
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203organization. If we impose an additional constraint that the weights must sum to 
one (i.e. ), the above DEA model becomes a variable returns to scale 
(VRS) model. It allows for the existence of economies and diseconomies of scale. 
The estimation of technical efficiency with CRS and VRS assumptions allows the 
overall technical efficiency (OTE) to be decomposed into two collectively exhaus-
tive components: pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE), i.e. 
OTE = PT × SE (Singh and Bansal, 2017). PTE is also known as managerial effi-
ciency. Further, an independent samples t-test is used in order to compare the 
efficiency score of public and private sector firms.
4.3 INPUT-OUTPUT SPECIFICATION 
For specifying the input and output variables, the present study follows the 
approach adopted by Mohan and Ray (2003). Energy, raw material, wages, and 
capital are used as inputs. Since energy and raw materials are used as inputs, the 
use of gross output, rather than net value added (NVA), is appropriate. Using NVA 
as output is suitable only when labour and capital are considered as inputs. Net 
sales of firms (i.e. sales net of excise duties) adjusted for changes in inventories 
are used as gross output. Instead of using the gross or fixed assets, the summation 
of two items, interest and depreciation is used as capital that is based on flows (not 
on stocks) like other measures for output and inputs. All nominal values have been 
appropriately deflated. 
4.4 TOBIT MODEL 
In order to examine the impact of ownership on the technical efficiency of selected 
firms in our sample, a second stage analysis of the technical efficiency scores 
obtained in stage one is performed by applying the Tobit regression model. Since 
the dependent variable efficiency score is bounded between 0 and 1, an appropri-
ate theoretical specification is Tobit model with two side censoring (Sufian and 
Abdul Majid, 2008):
where Yit = technical efficiency scores of firm i, in year t, CLit = capital-labour ratio 
(measured as the ratio of fixed capital to employee cost) of firm i in year t, Sizeit = 
share of firm i in industry’s total sales in year t, Ht = Herfindahl index in year 
t,Pub =1 if firm belongs to public sector and zero otherwise, Indj= 1 if firm belongs 
to industries j and zero otherwise (industry code 1 is assigned to the engineering 
goods industry which is used as the reference industry) and T = 1 if observation is 
from year t and zero otherwise (year 2011 is used as the reference year). It is worth 
mentioning that the impact of ownership on the technical efficiency of a firm in 
the engineering goods industry cannot be measured by the above specification of 
the model. In order to measure the impact of ownership in this sector, the above 
model is re-estimated assuming the Fertilizers sector as the reference industry. 
The results for other industries are fairly similar to the findings of the previous 
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204 5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 2 presents the principal characteristics of selected public and private firms. 
The table shows that two industries (viz. refineries and power generation & sup-
ply) are characterized by government monopoly, as state owned firms in these two 
industries, on average, cover 76.57 and 68.29 percent of industry’s total sales 
respectively over the period of time. In the other three industries (i.e. engineering 
goods, fertilizers, and mining/minerals) the private sector has the largest part of 
(approximately 70 percent) of the industry’s total sales over the period under con-
sideration. The percentage share of selected firms in industry’s total assets and 
employee cost demonstrates that public sector firms are relatively labour intensive 
whereas private sector firms are relatively capital intensive. Further, the Herfind-
ahl index and the concentration ratio measure the extent of competition in each of 
the industries. A relatively low value of these two indices in an industry indicates 
a high degree of competition in that industry. The degree of competition is highest 
in the power generation & supply industry followed by engineering goods and 
fertilizers industries. As far as mining/minerals and refinery industries are con-
cerned, the competition is lowest in these two industries.
Table 2 



















Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Engineering 25.31 74.09 21.22 78.46 24.54 75.06 0.12 56.60
Fertilizers 29.76 67.73 19.16 72.73 46.58 49.98 0.10 50.62
Refineries 76.57 23.42 68.33 32.04 78.25 21.74 0.19 83.09
Mining/minerals 22.10 77.89 23.68 76.31 62.73 37.26 0.45 86.99
Power 68.29 31.70 71.87 28.12 74.76 25.23 0.05 33.51
Note: the figures in the table are the averages of the period from 2011 to 2015.
Source: author’s calculation.
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the efficiency score of selected public 
and private sector firms for the period 2011 to 2015. The mean OTE scores of 
engineering goods, refineries, and power generation & supply industries are 
increasing over time. This is because in these industries, both public and private 
sector firms have improved their performance over time, as indicated by the 
increased value of their mean OTE scores in 2015 compared to that of 2011. How-
ever, this improvement is more consistent for the private sector, as revealed by the 
decreased values of standard deviation in 2015 for each of the three industries. In 
the fertilizers and mining industries, the average efficiency score is declining over 
time at the industry level. In the fertilizers industry, the mean OTE scores of both 
1  and , where Si is the ratio of firm ith sales to that of industry.
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205sectors have declined marginally over the period. However, the value of standard 
deviation for the public sector has increased substantially relative to that of the 
private sector which implies that the problem of declining efficiency is more seri-
ous in the public sector. As far as the mining industry is concerned, the mean OTE 
score of private sector firms is fairly stable over time, though it is in decline in the 
case of PSEs. If the standard deviation is considered, it can be seen that its value 
has decreased considerably for the public sector and increased for the private sec-
tor over the period. This implies that the OTE score of an average PSE concen-
trates to the sectoral mean over the period of time, whereas the opposite is true in 
case of private sector firms.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of overall technical efficiency (OTE), 2011 to 2015
Industry Year Mean OTE Standard deviation Range 



































































































5.1 RESULTS OF INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T TEST
Table 4 compares the average technical efficiency of public and private sector 
firms in five different industries from 2011 to 2015. The table demonstrates that 
out of five, in two industries (i.e. engineering goods and fertilizers) the OTE of 
private sector companies is significantly greater than that of PSEs over the period. 
In the engineering goods sector, the mean OTE score of private firms exceeds the 
mean OTE score of their public counterparts by as much as 5.8 percentage points, 
whereas in the case of the fertilizers industry, the mean OTE score of private sec-
tor firms is significantly greater than that of the PSEs by 5.7 percentage points. In 
order to find out the sources of this inefficiency, one must investigate the PTE and 
SE scores of the decision making units under consideration. In both industries, 
PSEs have a significantly low PTE score as compared with their private counter-
parts, which indicates the presence of managerial inefficiency in the operation of 
PSEs in these two industries. As far as scale efficiency is concerned, both public 
and private sector firms are reported equally efficient over the period of time in 
both industries. Therefore the main reason for inefficiency in the operations of 
PSEs may be attributed to managerial inefficiency rather than to inefficiency 
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206 firm’s given resources, whereas the SE refers to exploiting scale economies by 
operating at a point where the production frontier exhibits constant returns to scale 
(Sufian and Habibullah, 2009). It is noteworthy that in both of these two industries 
(i.e. engineering goods and fertilizers), the degree of competition is relatively high 
in the context of the industries under consideration. This implies that when the 
policy of privatization is carried out together with increased competition, privati-
zation will certainly result in improvements in efficiency (Ramaswamy, 2001; 
Megginson, 2005).
In the case of the mining/minerals sector, no significant difference has been 
observed in the performance of public and private sector firms as far as OTE is 
concerned. On an average, both sectors are reported with approximately 25 per-
cent inefficiency. Since efficiency is measured using an input-oriented DEA 
model, which implies that an average firm in mining/minerals industry if produc-
ing its output on the efficient frontier instead of its current location would need 
only 75 percent of the inputs currently being used; by adopting best practice tech-
nology, firms, on average, can reduce their inputs by at least 25 percent. However, 
sources of inefficiency differ in the two sectors as indicated by their PTE and SE 
scores in table 4. The mean PTE score (0.852) of private sector firms is signifi-
cantly lower than that (0.949) of the public sector, by 0.098, for the period under 
consideration. Therefore, it is evident that with respect to the efficient use of 
inputs, PSEs outperform their private counterparts. As far as SE is concerned, 
private sector firms exhibit a significant lead over their public counterparts. This 
implies that private sector firms are operating closer to the minimum point of their 
long-run average cost curve than their public counterparts. Therefore, the lead of 
the PSEs in efficient use of inputs is completely offset by their inefficiency in real-
izing economies of scale as compared to private sector firms, which, as a result, 
renders the differences between the performances of these two categories of firms 
statistically insignificant as far as OTE is concerned. Further, the degree of con-
centration is very high in the mining/mineral industry (as indicated by the Herfin-
dahl index and concentration ratio in table 2). This lack of competition may be 
regarded as a potential source of technical inefficiency in the operations of both 
public and private firms in this industry, which consequently renders the differ-
ence between the OTE of these two sectors statistically insignificant. From the 
Hicksian perspective, the monopolistic structure of the market results in loss of 
efficiency by enabling firms to charge prices above the marginal cost and to pro-
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207Table 4
Average technical efficiency of public and private sector firms, 2011 to 2015
Industry Average sectoral technical efficiency
OTE PTE SE
Engineering goods
Private sector 0.969 0.994 0.975
Public sector 0.911 0.934 0.976
Mean difference 0.058** 0.06** -0.001
Fertilizers 
Private sector 0.97 0.989 0.981
Public sector 0.912 0.964 0.978
Mean difference 0.057** 0.025** 0.002
Mining/minerals 
Private sector 0.751 0.852 0.889
Public sector 0.729 0.949 0.777
Mean difference 0.022 -0.098** 0.112**
Refineries 
Private sector 0.758 0.956 0.799
Public sector 0.892 0.992 0.899
Mean difference -0.135** -0.036** -0.1**
Power generation
& supply
Private sector 0.768 0.907 0.851
Public sector 0.731 0.912 0.794
Mean difference 0.037 -0.005 0.057
***, **, and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Source: author’s calculation.
In refineries, the mean OTE score of PSEs as a group is 0.892 and in the case of 
private sector firms, it is 0.758, which is significantly lower than that of publicly 
owned firms. However, as compared to the benchmark, public and private sector 
firms are observed with 11 and 24 percent inefficiencies over the period of time. 
The superior performance of the public sector is attributable to both managerial 
and scale factors. The mean PTE score of PSEs is significantly greater than that of 
private firms by 3.6 percentage point, which indicates a relatively high managerial 
efficiency of the public sector in the use of available inputs. As far as scale effi-
ciency is concerned, the mean SE score in the public sector significantly exceeds 
the mean score of their private counterparts by 10 percentage points. This implies 
that PSEs are operating closer to the optimal level of scale than the privately owned 
firms in refinery sector. The superior performance of the public sector in this indus-
try may be due to the fact that the public sector has enjoyed a monopoly for a long 
period of time in this industry. Moreover, in India the refinery industry has been a 
subject of price control for a long period of time, which constrained the entry of 
private firms into this industry by making it less profitable for the private sector.
Further, table 4 demonstrates that in the power generation & supply industry, the 
mean OTE score of private sector firms for the period of study is 0.768, which is 
slightly greater than that of PSEs by 0.037; however, the difference is statistically 
insignificant. Another thing which can be observed is that the mean OTE scores of 
both public and private sector firms are significantly low as compared to the 
benchmark. In the case of PSEs, on an average, 26.9 percent inefficiency is pre-
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208 firms, the size of inefficiency is approximately 23.2 percent. As indicated by their 
PTE and SE scores, both managerial and scale factors contribute significantly to 
the overall inefficiency in the two sectors. The average size of managerial ineffi-
ciencies in the operation of public sector firms is 8.8 percent, while in the case of 
private sector firms it is 9.3 percent. Therefore, with respect to the efficient use of 
inputs, firms in the two sectors are equally efficient or inefficient. As far as scale 
inefficiency is concerned, 14.9 percent scale inefficiency exists in the production 
process of private firms, while in the case of PSEs; the average size of scale inef-
ficiency is 20.6 percent. Therefore, as with managerial efficiency, both sectors are 
equally scale efficient or inefficient in the power sector. It is important to note that 
like refineries, in the power industry the market power is concentrated in favour of 
the public sector. Apart from this, in India the prices of electricity are regulated by 
the government instead of by market forces. Therefore, both government monop-
oly and regulation may be regarded as a possible source of the inefficiency present 
in the power sector as a whole.
5.2 RESULTS OF TOBIT REGRESSION MODEL
In order to corroborate the findings of the previous section, this section tries to 
investigate the impact of ownership on the various estimates of technical effi-
ciency (viz. OTE, PTE and SE) of firms by using the Tobit regression model. The 
regression analysis by controlling the firm- and industry-specific characteristics 
provides a more robust analysis of the relative performance of state owned and 
privately owned firms. For this purpose, we have run three regressions taking 
OTE, PTE and SE as dependent variables and dummy variables for ownership, 
industry, industry interacting with ownership, and time as the independent varia-
bles. Apart from this, the size of a firm (which is measured in terms of its share in 
total sales of industry), capital-labour ratio, and Herfindahl Index (which is used 
as the proxy of monopoly position of the market) are used as additional control 
variables. All of these variables reflect firm- and industry-specific characteristics 
that might affect the efficiency of firms, apart from the ownership structure.
Table 5 demonstrates that all of the coefficients (δi) of the time dummies in all of 
the three regression models are statistically insignificant, which implies that time 
does not have any significant impact on the overall efficiency or on the managerial 
and scale efficiency of a firm. The results also show that the capital-labour (CL) 
ratio has significant and negative impacts on OTE as well as PTE. However, its 
impact on SE is found to be statistically insignificant. Since PTE and SE are the 
collectively exhaustive components of OTE, it is evident that the CL ratio is 
affecting the OTE through PTE. The negative impact of the capital-labour ratio on 
efficiency implies that either labour is more productive than capital (as in case of 
labour-augmenting technological progress) or Indian firms are using capital 
beyond the optimal level (as in the case of the existence of excess capacity). What-
ever the case, if these firms substitute labour for capital, i.e. use capital saving 
techniques of production, it will increase their productive efficiency. Further it is 
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209As far as SE is concerned, the impact of size is reported insignificant. Therefore, 
as with the CL ratio, the size of a firm affects OTE through PTE. From a Schum-
peterian perspective, a positive impact of size on efficiency indicates that a large 
firm has a higher tendency to make product and process innovations which 
increase its productive efficiency. Further, the monopolistic structure of a market 
(as measured by the Hefindahl Index) has a significantly negative impact on PTE 
which implies that the monopolistic structure of the market reduces the manage-
rial incentives to produce at the minimum cost since the firms can charge the 
prices above the marginal cost and therefore, can survive in the economy in spite 
of their higher costs.
The interaction coefficients (γj) measure the impact of ownership on the perfor-
mance of firms in a particular industry. Table 5 shows that the interaction coeffi-
cient (γj) is statistically significant only for the refinery industry if we consider 
OTE as the dependent variable. This means that even after controlling for the 
impact of firm and industry specific characteristics, state ownership has a positive 
impact on the OTE of a firm in the refinery sector while in case of the remaining 
four industries (viz. engineering goods, fertilizers, mining/minerals, and power), 
ownership does not matter. Further, table 5 shows that in the case of four indus-
tries (viz. engineering goods, mining/minerals, refineries, and power), public 
ownership has a significant impact on PTE, i.e. the efficiency of management in 
the utilization of available inputs, as indicated by the highly significant interaction 
coefficients (γj) for these industries. In the case of the engineering goods sector, 
state ownership has a negative impact on the managerial efficiency of PSEs, i.e. 
PSEs suffer from managerial underperformance. Thus, privatizing these firms will 
certainly improve their managerial performance in this industry. However, in the 
case of mining, refineries, and power, state ownership has a positive impact on 
managerial performance. This implies that even if we remove the scale effect, 
transferring the ownership of PSEs to private sector will reduce the managerial 
efficiency of PSEs in these three industries. Therefore, like those of Mohan and 
Ray (2003), our results reject the argument that the performance of private sector 
would be superior to that of public sector once we adjusted for the scale effect. As 
far as SE is concerned, state ownership has significant effect on SE in only two 
industries, i.e. refineries and power generation & supply. In the case of refineries, 
the public sector has advantage of scale, while it is operating with diseconomies 
of scale in power sector. It is worth mentioning that the results of the Tobit model 
are somewhat different from the results of the independent samples t-test, in that, 
as per Tobit model, the public sector is reported as being marginally superior to 
the private sector in terms of both OTE and PTE. This may happen due to the dif-
ference in the nature of two methodologies. Unlike the t-test, regression analysis 
controls the effect of other explanatory variables by including them in the model 



















































Const (α0) 1.04993*** 1.40393*** 1.06753***
CL (α1) −1.194e-05*** −2.476e-05*** 3.473e-06
Size (α2) 0.166651** 0.634850*** −0.117076
H (α3) −0.419001 −1.17132** 0.0588547
Pub (α4) −0.0545116*** −0.181944*** −0.0290541
Ind2 (β2) −0.0284189 −0.147134** 0.0163939
Ind3 (β3) −0.215366*** −0.300554*** −0.136254***
Ind4 (β4) −0.193480*** −0.0446409 −0.218155***
Ind5 (β5) −0.0914068** −0.120872 −0.0859020*
Ind1 Pub (γ1) 0.0172838 −0.073493** 0.00322398
Ind2 Pub (γ2) −0.00686827 0.0734939 −0.00322398
Ind3 Pub (γ3) 0.0343362 0.387319*** −0.0870903
Ind4 Pub (γ4) 0.167070*** 0.159962** 0.133120**
Ind5 Pub (γ5) −0.0611306 0.195389** −0.127205**
T12 (δ12) −0.0318665 −0.0345488 −0.0138445
T13 (δ13) 0.0149875 −0.0358358 0.0193831
T14 (δ14) 0.0275370 −0.0141005 0.0304489
T15 (δ15) 0.00427809 −0.0198059 0.00490746
Sigma 0.180388*** 0.184465** 0.213104**
***, **, and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Source: authors’ calculation.
The relatively high managerial efficiency of state owned firms may be attributed 
to the fact that most of the PSEs in our sample belongs to the Maharatna and 
Navratna categories. As the part of economic reforms initiated in 1991, the GOI 
gradually closed or sold off sick PSEs to the private sector. Profit-making PSEs 
were classified as Maharatna, Navratna and Miniratna PSEs based on their per-
formance. These PSEs have been given substantially enhanced autonomy and 
operational freedom, which significantly increases their efficiency. Further, con-
tinuously increasing competition from both domestic and foreign firms in the post 
reform period also helped these PSEs in improving their efficiency. Moreover, it 
may be possible that underlying structural factors, such as poor governance, weak 
law enforcement and tardy bankruptcy procedures tend to keep the private sector 
from realizing its fullest potential (Mohan and Ray, 2003).
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, an analysis of the performance of public and private sector firms 
operating in five different industries has been made over the period 2011 to 2015. 
Using DEA, the performance has been measured in terms of technical efficiency. 
In order to compare the technical efficiency of public and private sector enterprises, 
two distinct methodologies, the independent samples t-test and the Tobit regression 
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211follows. First, the results of t-test indicate that out of five, the private sector has 
significantly high OTE as well as PTE in two industries, engineering goods and 
fertilizers, where competition is relatively high. In contrast, in refineries where 
market power is concentrated to the public sector, PSEs have considerably higher 
OTE and PTE as well as SE than their private counterparts. Therefore it may be 
concluded that competition along with privatization plays a positive role in improv-
ing the efficiency of firms. Second, the results of the Tobit model reveal that even 
after controlling for the effect of firm specific characteristics and that of the monop-
olistic structure of the market, the public sector emerges as a superior performer in 
respect of OTE in the refinery industry. In rest of the four industries, ownership 
does not matter. Third, if we consider the argument that PSEs enjoy the advantages 
of scale and compare their performance with that of their private counterparts only 
in terms of PTE, the public sector emerges as a superior performer in three indus-
tries (mining/minerals, refineries, and power generation & supply). Against this, 
the private sector has significantly high PTE only in engineering goods industry. 
This implies that only in one industry out of five, transferring ownership to the 
private sector would result in efficiency gains, even if we disregarded the scale 
effect. In three industries, privatization would result in a loss of managerial effi-
ciency. In the case of the remaining two industries, no firm conclusion can be made 
regarding the impact of public or private ownership.
The effectiveness of privatization is based on the link between the market for 
corporate control and enterprise performance. Considerable information poverty 
among shareholders and potential raiders regarding the true performance of a firm 
coupled with the high transaction costs of takeovers due to the time consuming 
process of transferring shares between sellers and buyers, and stringent takeover 
regulations can weaken this link in developing countries like India (Sarkar, Sarkar 
and Bhaumik, 1998). Thus, the policy of privatization cannot effectively increase 
the efficiency of private sector firms in these countries. The positive impact of 
privatization on economic performance can take place only in an appropriate insti-
tutional environment with relevant legal standards, i.e. protection of shareholders 
and creditors, righteous and enforceable contracts, functioning bankruptcy courts, 
adequate banking system, capital market supervision, and so on (Tichá, 2012).
Disclosure statement 
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212 APPENDIX
Table a1
List of the selected public and private sector firms




B H E L Public
BEML Ltd Public
Bharat Dynamics Ltd Public
Engineers India Ltd Public
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd Public
Larsen & Toubro Ltd Private
Siemens Ltd Private
Tata Projects Ltd Private
CG Power & Industrial Solution Ltd Private
Crompton Greaves Ltd Private
Thermax Ltd Private
BGR Energy Systems Ltd Private
Tata Hitachi Construction Machinery Company Pvt Ltd Private
IL&FS Transportation Networks Ltd Private
L&T Technology Services Ltd Private
ISGEC Heavy Engineering Ltd Private
Sunil Hitech Engineers Ltd Private
Ashoka Buildcon Ltd Private
Fertilizers
Nation Fertilizers Ltd Public
Rashtriya Chemicals & Fertilizers Ltd Public
Madras Fertilizers Ltd Public
Fertilisers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd Public
Coromandel International Ltd Private
Chambal Fertilizers & Chemical Ltd Private
Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemical Ltd Private
Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers & Chemical Ltd Private
Zuari Agro Chemicals Ltd Private
Nagarjuna Fertilizers & Chemical Ltd Private
Deepak Fertilizers & Petrochemicals Corp. Ltd Private
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Coal India Ltd Public
Gujarat Mineral Development Corp. Ltd Public
MOIL Ltd Public
NMDC Ltd Public
20 Microns Ltd Private
Associated Stone Industries Ltd Private
Facor Alloys Ltd Private
Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd Private
Indian Metals & Ferro Alloys Ltd Private
Indsil Hydro Power & Manganese Ltd Private
Maithan Alloys Ltd Private
Rohit Ferro Tech Ltd Private
Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd Private
Shirpur Gold Refinery Ltd Private
Vedanta Ltd Private
Refineries 
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd Public
Bharat Oman Refinery Ltd Public
Chennai Petroleum Corporation Ltd Public
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd Public
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd Public
Mangalore Refinery & Petrochemicals Ltd Public
Numaligarh Refinery Ltd Public
Essar Oil Ltd Private
HPCL-Mittal Energy Ltd Private





Gujarat Industries Power Company Ltd Public
NHPC Ltd Public
NLC India Ltd Public
Power Grid Corp. of India Ltd Public
SJVN Ltd Public
Adani Power Ltd Private
CESC Ltd Private
Jaiprakash Power Ventures Ltd Private
JSW Energy Ltd Private
RattanIndia Power Ltd Private
Reliance Infrastructure Ltd Private
Reliance Power Ltd Private
Schneider Electric Infrastructure Ltd Private
Suzlon Energy Ltd Private
Tata Power Company Ltd Private
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